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INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a brief survey of the theoretical literature 
dealing with innovation in a market economy. The survey is organized 
around the followiD.g topics: first, the theory of the production, mar­
keting and use of innovations; second, welfare aspects of innovative 
activities; and third, factor augmenti.ng bias in innovation. The survey 
attempts to summarize the present state of knowledge concerning 
these topics. 
It is only fair to state that the economic theory of innovation 
is still in its infancy, with major problems unsolved. The most im­
portant of these arise because of the central role played by uncertainty 
in innovation. Beyond purely technological uncertainty associated 
with creating innovations, there are uncertainties arising from 
responses of rivals and uncertainties due to the speculative nature 
of tF.i.e uses tu which innovations can be put as well, as other sources of 
risk to the innovator. Moral hazards and imperfections of the capital 
market interfere with the use of the market mechanism to eliminate 
these uncertainties. This is compounded in the case of innovative 
activity by the problems of inappropriability and indivisibility. It 
is our view that these latter constitut'e problems of seCondary importance 
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relative to those arising from uncertainty, but they represent additional 
sources of difficulty for a market oriented economy, in its allocation of 
resources to R&:D. The _theory of innovation is sufficiently advanced 
so that these basic problem areas can be identified, but on the other 
hand the theory is of limited value in devising policy measures to 
solve these problems. For example, it is still a matter of active 
debate as Ito whether monopoly power is a help or a hindrance in 
increasing the rate of technological progress in the economy. 
In. those areas of economic theory applied to policy analysis 
that are presently well-formulated, two elements are normally 
present: {l) a well-defined set of optimality conditions and (Z) a 
description of institutions whose functioning would lead to satisfaction 
of the optimality conditions. The economic theory of innovations 
provides neither. Normative statements about innovations are at 
best based on partial analysis rather thall on the appropriate general 
equilibrium framework, and are often crude. !Y1ore importantly, the 
theory gives no indications as to the set of institutions that could 
lead to optimality. Institutions de signed to mandate appropriate 
behavior in one dimension preclude appropriate behavior in some 
other dimension. For example. strengthening the patent system 
may increase the incentive to produce innovations but this entails 
a r�duction in their utilization below an optimal level, 
The difficulties involved in creating a viable economic 
theory of innovation are deep-seated. Econom£c theory is most 
informative when dealing with routinized operations; in fact, it is 
almost the essence of the theory that it reduces compl�x situations 
to simplified decision problems that could as well, if not bHtter, be 
solved by a computer than by the economic actors themselves. After 
all is said and done, innovation is concerned with the creation of 
new alternatives; if this process could be routinized, it would no 
longer qualify as innovation. 
What descriptive economic theory in fact provides us with 
is a model of the process of choosing from among innovations once 
they are created, and a study of the market processes that either 
help or hinder this choice process. If product innovations begin to 
look very much like advertising expenditures, and if proc·ess inno­
vations like movements along an isoquant in response to changes in 
factor prices, this is because 'the unique character of innovation 
as an economic phenomenon has been suppressed in order to apply 
the economic theory of routinized operations to innovation; 
Finally, even within the rather· narrow range of problem 
areas concerning innovation where economic theory provides 
insights, there are major unsolved theoretical issues. The theory 
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of information as a commodity is still very much to be explored, 
oligopoly theory and the theory of rival responses in situations of 
confrontation is hung up awaiting a resolution of the prisoner1s 
dilemma paradox, and we know very little concerning the theory of 
human capital specialized to creative activities. In summary, the 
problems of innovation cut across so many difficult areas of economic 
theory that it is not surprising that economists have yet to develop 
a satisfactory approach even to those problem areas where economists 
might ultimately provide interesting comments. 
The Market for Innovations 
The literature dealing with the market for innovations 
is dominated by two major themes: first, the Schumpeterian 
hypothesii� (see Schumpeter, 195 0 ) that monopoly power leads 
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to a faster rate of technical progress than does classical competition; 
and, second, the Arrow paradigm (see Arrow, 1962) that views 
innovations as inf ormation, with market problems associated with 
uncertainty, indivisibilities and inappropriability. These tv10 themes 
are not unrelated, of course; it is in fact the existence of the market 
problems identified by Arrow that forms the theoretical just:ification 
for the Schumpeterian hypothesis, with its implied conclusion that 
losses in static efficiency brought about by monopoly power might 
be more tihan offset by corresponding gains in dynamic efficiency. 
In dealing with the controversies concerning these fun-
damental !:hemes, it is convenient to isolate certain features of the market 
for innovations for study. The survey that follows deals with problems 
associated with the prod.uction of innovations; with the �eting of 
innovations; and with the� of innovations once they are available. 
A starting point is the notion of innovation itself. Kuznets ( 1962) 
defines innovation as "an application of a new way of attaining a useful 
end," while Arrow {1962.) defines invention as 11the production of 
knowledge. 1' Traditionally, the two concepts have been viewed by 
economists as markedly different. For e:i;:ample, Schumpeter (1950) 
assumed that invention was exogenous to the economic system, while 
innovation was endogenous, representing the main activity of the 
entrepreneur. However Schrnookler ( 1966) has provided convincing 
evidence that invention is largely demand oriented rather than being 
determined primarily by the state of knowledge of the sciences. 
Thus, both invention and innovation fall within the province of the 
economist., Most of the literature, however, centers its attention 
on innovation rather than inventions; silnilarly, the emphasis i.s on 
the development aspects of R&:D rather than on research. 
The Production of Innovations 
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Turning to the production of innovations, there are a few 
stylized facts that appear in the literature. Along with others, Nordhaus 
(1969) points out that the innovating prOce ss is typically highly labor 
intensive; labor is the most flexible factor of production, and capital 
intensive processes are inappropriate in the face of the uncertainties 
that abound i.n the production of innovations. Mansfield {1968a and b) 
indicates that innovative activitie s,  whether measured in terms of 
inputs or outputs, are relatively more important (as a percent of sales 
or of employment) in firms in the medium to la'rge class, rather than 
in the very largest firms in an industry. The growing importance of 
corporate financed research, expecially since World War II, i.s 
emphasized by Schmookler ( 1966), s uggesting an increase in the 
amount of Hin house11 research. On the other hand, Jewkes ( 1959). 
Klein'( l962) and Salter (1960) note the crucial roles played by small 
firms and by 11outsiders11 in important inventions developed in the recent 
past (nylon, diesel locomotive, jet airplane, Polaroid camera, 
computers, etc.). Mueller (1962) reinforces this·point by noting 
that a maj�r fraction of Dupone s sales represents products developed 
by other companies. Thus the issue of scale economies in the production 
of innovations is still not completely resolved. Perhaps the most 
convincing theoretical argum ent for economies of scale in R&D activities 
is the contention that large firms can reduce the riskiness of R&D by 
engaging in a number of independent lines of research, avoiding the 
"all of the eggs in one basket11 problem (see Arrow, 1962 and Nordhaus, 1969) . 
Unfortunately, there is also some evidence that the probability 
distribution of returns from innovative activity may be such that 
increased diversification does not reduce risk measured as the 
variance of returns (see Nordhaus, 1973 ). 
Uncertainties play a central role in all discus sions of 
innovations. In fact, Arrow (1969) characterizes the process of 
producing innovations as one of 11reducing uncertainties. 11 Under 
the proper conditions, the existence of commodity-option (insurance) 
markets for the sharing of risks leads to an efficient allocat- on of 
resources under uncertainty in a competitive economy 
(see Arrow 1965 ,Debreu 1959). However, the presence of "rnoral 
hazards11  interferes with the working of such market s.  Arrow (1962) 
notes that moral hazards effectively preclude the application of 
insurance to innovative activies. For example, if an R&D firm 
could insure against its i.nability to produce a des ired product, the 
incentive to succeed in innovation would be seriously weakened. * 
Arrow concludes that, as suming risk aversion, less than the social 
optimum amount of resources is allocated to the process of producing 
innovations .  
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Marschak ( 1967) views the production of innovatio;'.J.s as a 
process in which a priori:_ distributions over the parameters char­
acterizing the production map are converted i.nto narrower a posteriori 
distributions. His. model of optimum management of R&D activitie s 
emphasizes the sequential nature of decision making i.n innovation, 
as well as the gains to be a c hieved from parallel lines of research in 
the face of strong uncertainties, following up earlier suggestions by 
Kle in ( 1962). While both of  these aspects of R&D management suggest 
• 
Beyond thi s , the cost to an insurer of acquiring adequate information 
concerning the distribution of payoffs from R&D activities no doubt 
would preclude the economic viability of insurance, even if moral 
hazards were not present. 
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possible gains tha't might be achieved by centralized control of R&D as 
contrasted with decentralized decision making, in fact Marschak1s 
examples of R&D decision making in military procurement generally 
indicate losses in efficiency from too rigid management by the Pentagon. 
Finally, to the extent that centralized direction appears to offer gains 
in efficiency, 'this occurs in the development stage of R&:D rather than 
in the research stage. Mars chak1s conclusions are thus in line with 
those of empirically oriented economists who agree that the financial 
requirements of the development phase of R&D lead to a concentration 
of such work in medium to large firms rather than in small firms. 
The Marketing of Innovations 
The Arrow paradigm centers on the problems posed for 
the marketing of innovations by viewing the innovation a s  disembodied 
knowledge, As in most of the literatuire, innovations are as sumed to 
be process innovations, acting to reduce the costs of producing 
existing goods. In its purest form, the Arrow paradigm is one in 
which an innovation, once produced, can be applied to the production 
of unlimi.ted units of other goods with zero marginal cost. This raises 
the problem of indivisibilities -- while production of the innovation 
requires the application of certain quantities of factors of production, 
it can be reproduced without the expenditure of any further resources. 
The optimum charge for access to the innovation is the marginal 
cost of reproduction, i. e. , zero. The indivisibilities a ssociated 
with innovations lead to problems similar to those encountered in 
the classic case of public goods (see Samuelson, 1955 ) . If marginal 
cost pricing is followed, we obtain the optimum use of the innovation, 
but there is no incentive to produce the innovation. On the other 
hand, if property rights to the innovation are vested in the innovator 
so that licensing or royalty payments can be exacted from users, 
this restores in part the incentives for production of innovation, but 
leads to less than optimal use of innovations once produced. 
Related to this is the fact that there are difficulties in 
e stablishing and protecting property rights in innovations, This is 
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the :e_roblem of inappropriability of innovations. Viewed ai:; pure 
information, innovations suffer from the difficulty that a n1onopoly 
position can be maintained only so long as only the innovator possesses 
the information. Once the innovation is licensed to even one user, 
that user then acquires the information possessed by the innovator 
and is in a position to compete with the innovator in the marketing 
of the innovation. The patent system at best offers only partial 
protection to the innovator. Schrnookler 1 s  data indicate a :marked 
fall in patenting following World War II, despite a continuing iricrease 
in private R&D activity. as measured by expenditures and the 
employm.ent of .technical personnel. The conventional wisdom holds 
that.patent rights are relatively ineffective as a device for maintaining 
a monopoly position with respect to an innovation. Imitators ,  patent 
infringers and patent suits all act to limit the profits the innovator 
can capture; the usual e stimate is that the innovator proba.bly can 
obtain only those profi·ts that would accrue in any case simply because 
of the two .or three year lead time the innovator has over rival firms. 
Thus the absence of protected property rights in innovations acts to 
lessen th'e.incentives for 'producing innovations. 
In contrast with these views which emphasize the role played 
by inappropriability in restricting the output of innovations (or of any 
kind of 11pure11 information), Hirschleifer ( 1 970) argues that the 
private value of an innovation bears no necessary relation to its 
social value. Thus we might have too much in the way of resources 
devoted to innovative a.ctivities rather than too little; in any case, it 
does not follow from the fact that innoVations are "pure" information 
that inapprop"riability i.s inevitable nor that the society produces too 
little in the way of innovations. The point is that the innovator as 
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possessor of an item of information has available to him such options 
as investing in the stocks of companies that would benefit from the 
innovation, margin buying in futures markets or buying up resources 
specialized to the production of goods to which the innovation could 
be applied. Having taken a speculative position the innovator then 
announces his new production process to the world and reaps the 
rents that would otherwise accrue to firms or to factors. In Iact 
he can license the innovation and in certain circumstances can 
capture� than the social value of the innovation. Hirschleifer 
notes that the private value of the knowledge that horse A is the fastest 
in a race can be far in excess of whatever social value there might 
be in the knowledge as to swiftness obtained from the running of the 
race itself. 
The Hirschleifer approach leaves the problem of optimal 
all�cation of resources to innovation or other information produciUg 
activities in something of a no-man1 s-land. In order to accurately 
judge the optimal character of institutions operating in the market 
for information i.t i.s necessary to examine in detail the speculative 
opportunities afforded the innovator throughout the economic system. 
Hirschleifer is well aware that imperfect capital markets 
and the lack of adequate futures markets limits the extent to which this 
argument leads to conclusions concerning the allocation of resources 
to innovations different from those obtained by Arrow. But these 
imperfections are present in situations unrelated to innovations; for 
example, in the timing of equipment replacement, with equiprnent of 
known characteristics. The problem peculiar to innovations in this 
regard is the fact that in order to establish the value of the asset he 
pledges for loans (namely the innovation itself), the innovator is 
required to divulge information to the banker that can destroy the 
innovator1s monopoly position: in brief, imperfections facing 
innovators in the capital m3.rket are an almost inevitable conse­
quence of the peculiarities of innovations. 
It should also be pointed out that speculative activities as 
envisaged by Hirschleifer involve major risks 3imply because 
market prices are influenced by so many other elements beyond the 
existence or nonexistence of the innovation. 
The Use of Innovations 
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As regards the use of innovations, the literature is concerned 
primarily with the effect of market structure on the adoption of 
innovations. There are a number of different approaches that have been 
taken, and the conclusions derived are guite sensitive to the structures 
of the models employed. In Arrow1s original formulation of the 
market structure problem ( 1962), the question posed is the following. 
Is there a greater incentive to produce innovations for a co.mpetitive 
industry or for the same industry operated as a monopoly? Actually, 
Arrow contrasts the case of a monopolistic inventor producing a cost 
saving innovation for a competitive industry with that of a n:-1onopolistic 
firm that produces a cost saving innovation for itself. Incentives are 
measured by profits that can be captured under ideal circurnstances; 
e. g·. ,  patent rights are inviolable. Arrow concludes that incentives 
are higher in the case of a competitive industry than Lcnder monopoly, 
but even in the competitive case, the innovator cannot capture the entire 
amount oJ social gains accruing because of the innovation. 
Tumsetz (1969) points out that Arrow1s conclusion rests on 
the fact that the output of the competitive industry is larger than it 
would be under monopoly control; if adjustment is made for the 
difference in output, then in fact the profits accruing are larger 
in the monopoly case. Kamien and Schwartz (1970) show that the 
crucial fact is the elasticity of the demand curve facing the industry; 
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the more elastic the de!nand, the larger is the incentive to produce the 
innovation. It shouicl be noted that Demsetz1 criticism is not really 
relevant to the question of whether dynamic efficiency is greater 
under monopolistic or competitive control of a given industry, 
since the relevant aspect of monopoly control is precisely its 
restriction of output. It should also be pointed out that there is no 
disagreement among these authors as to the fact that there is no 
incentive for a competitive firm to produce i.nnovations unless that 
fi.rm can establish at least partial monopoly rights to the innovation. 
Arrow's approach considers only the two polar extremes 
of pure monopoly and perfect competition. Horowitz ( 1963) concludes 
that in an oligopolistic industry, the incentive to adopt an innovation 
is greatest the fewer are the firms in the industry, and Ruff ( 1969), 
using a somewhat more complex model, a rri.ves at much the same 
conC:lusion. In the ir study of the timing of introduction of innovations, 
Kamien and Schwartz (1974) derive the interesting finding that some­
where between the extremes of perfect competition and pure monopoly 
is a market structure with the fastest rate of adoption of innovations. 
In a related paper ( 197.?J, they also point out the sensitivity of the 
decision to introduce an innovation to expectations; the faster is the 
expected future rate of technical progress, the later are innovations 
adopted. Finally, Swan, (1970) examines the question as to 
whether monopolies tend to restrict the range of products offered 
or tend to keep new products off the market. The conclusion reached 
is that whi.le monopolies wUl charge higher prices and will restrict 
output of whatever they produce, there are incentives for inonopolists 
just as competitors, to market those commodities desired by consumers. 
On net balance, the theoretical literature on market structure and 
innovations comes down on the side of the Schumpeterian hypothesis. 
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Comments 
The general impression one gets from the theoretical 
literature on innovations is wonder that any innovative activit�r at 
all takes place. There are large uncertainties involved in the process 
of p roducing an innovation; similar uncertainties as to the value of 
the innovation once it is produced (particularly with respect to rival 
innovations that might be in the works); and difficulties in n1aintai.ning 
property rights to whatever value attaches to the innovation. In the 
face of this, we have estimates ranging up to 90o/o as to the fraction of 
growth in output that is accounted for historically by innovations. 
While estimates of rates of return on innovations are relatively high 
(see E n o s ,  19 6 2  ), they do not appear to be high enough to 
offset the barriers supposedly facing the innovato r. This suggests 
that the paradigm employed in the study of the market for ir1novations 
is somewh2t misleading. To the extent that the Hi rschleifer objections 
hold, the amphasis on inappropriability is somewhat misdirected, of 
course. On the other hand, uncertainties in other aspects of innovative 
activities certainly ren1ain important. 
An alternative paradigm is the following. Innovation is 
still regarded as the production of new information, but instead of 
this information being disembodied, it is embodied in an expanded 
stock of human capital. (Denison (1962) emphasizes the human capital 
aspect of technological prog ress.) In the human capital paradigm, 
what is produced in the innovative p rocess is not simply a new product 
or a new process for p roducing existing goods, bt1t rather the know-how, 
embodied in the innovator and his staff, as to doing something new. In 
this paradigm, the marginal costs of reproducing innovations by other 
firms are not trivial, involving as they do the training required to 
instill the requisite knowledge in others. Furthermore, the services 
of human capital are not subject to the extreme problems of lack of 
appropria bili.ty that are present i.n the pure informatlon case. There 
a r e  still indivisibilities -- an innovator's knowledge can be applied 
E.Y. him to any number oi units of goods; and there are still uncer­
tainties; but the importance of appropriability as a factor defining the 
properties of the market for innovation is downgraded. Such a madel 
should inco rporate the fact that know-how is in part an o rganizational 
phenomenon so that a part of the knowledge acquired adheres to the 
firm in which the innovation occurs, rather than in specific individuals 
in the R&:D labs. 
There is some evidence for the human capital paradigm 
relative to the pure information paradigm. In particular, it is 
13 
difficult to explain the lead time accorded in the literature to innovating 
firms, even when innovations are not patented, except in the co.ntext 
of a human capital approach to innovation. Schmookler's data on 
the decline of patenting during a period in which more and more 
complex innovations are being produced similarly lends itself .to a 
human capital interpretation of innovation. Still, it is really an 
empirical question as to the importance of human capital formation 
in the innovative process; for certain innovations, the Arrow paradigm 
might be appropriate, while for others, human capital considerations 
might dominate. 
In the human capital approach to innovation, attention centers 
on the characteristics of the market for services. of skilled and creative 
innovators. To satisfy incentive compatibil·ity, such markets must 
offer to prospective employers a share in the quasi-rents that.innovators 
can generate, while offering innovators incentives to sign over such 
shares • .  This involves the creation of property rights to the innovator ' s  
human capital, accomplished through contracts that assign patent and/or 
marketing rights to innovations to the employing firm, and that include 
p rohibitions against working for other firms on projects related to those 
developed while under contract to the employing firm. Thus instruments 
exist to effect the trasfer of rights to human capital from the innovator to 
the firm. 
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The limited evidence cited earlier indicates that rnedium 
to large sized firms offer certain econon1ies of scale in R&D activities. 
The creation of human capii:al might be furthered by lumpy inputs such 
as laboratory facilities, and by interactions with other creative 
individuals. But there is an even more fundamental factor at work in 
concentrati.ng innovative activity within larger firms, namely the 
risk avoidance p'Ossibiliti.es present in such firms. The creation of 
innovations is inherently a high risk undertaking; risk averse 
innovators should be willing to accept salary and profit sharing 
arrangements paying less on the average than the expected value of 
the quasi-rents that their innovations can earn, while larger firms, 
d i versified over several innovators and several projects, can spread 
the risks and operate with a smaller dispersion about expected earnings 
than can innovators acting as individuals. Thus the concentration of 
R&D expenditures and output in medi.um to large sized firms is 
consistent with the human capital approach to innovations. 
It might be noted that the scale economies enjoyed by larger 
firms that arise from uncertainty in fact reflect simply the presence 
of those imperfections in the capital market that arise from default 
risk (see Quirk 1961 and Smith 1972). There are no scale economies 
of this type for the economic system itself; hence, to the extent that 
large firms enjoy monopoly power i.n the market for their outputs, the 
concentration of R&D activities in such firms tends to lower the rate 
of innovation as compared to a situation in which capital were available 
to both small and large R&D operations at the same marg inal cost. 
The only true economies of scale in R&.D for the economic systern are 
those associated with lumpy inputs. This suggests the need for public 
policy directed towards the provision of funds on a co- insurance basis 
for small independent R&D establish1nents. This approach seen-is par­
ticularly relevant in light of the thesls propounded by Klein (1974) in 
his recent book, that emphasizes the importance of competition 
in R&D as a source of "macrostabi.lity11 for the economy. 
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Welfare Economics of Innovation 
The significance of much of the work which bas been done 
on the welfare economics of innovation has been vitiated by two 
related faul t s :  arbitrary choice of a normative standard and reliance 
on partial equilibrium analysis.  At times it  appears that the only-
standard used is the amourrt of innovation, with more innovation 
necessarily being better. Leaving aside the difficulties of devising 
an unambiguous scalar measure of innovation, this standard is 
absurd because it ignores the cost of producing an innovation. Other 
standards have been total profits in an industry made up of inter­
dependent, innovating firms (Karnien and Schwartz, 1970), and consumers' 
surplus (I\Tordhaus , 1969). If one accepts Pareto Optimality as a 
fundamental normative standard, it ts necessary to reject any of 
these other standards a s  having welfare significance. It is  not true 
that a project which maximizes consumers' surplus is necessarily 
Pareto Optimal for all distributions of income, and it is  not poss ible 
to label a project desirable without considering distribution of income. 
Proper evaluation of the welfare implications of various 
ways in which innovations could be produced must be done in the 
framework of a general equilibrium analysis.  If the analysis does 
not provide complete ansv.i-ers, it at least makes clear the obstacles 
which pre.vent reliance on apparently more convenient approaches.
We will outline a potential approach to general equilibrium analys is 
which seems to underlie some of the rnore important and reliable 
analyses. 
Even with appropriate normative standards, any diagnosis 
of market failure in a partial equilibrium context can be at 
best suggestive, not conclusive. Hirschleifer1 s (1970) argument 
that the private value of information rnay exceed the social 
value is a case in point. Hirschleifer does not consider the manner 
in which expectations or beliefs are formed and policed. An analysis 
of all related markets is necessary to ensure that compensating 
adjustments elsewhere in the system do not relieve the problem 
isolated in the partial context. 
To formulate a general equilibrium approach we can 
define an econon'ly as consisting of the following elements: 1) a set 
of consumers, each of which is endowed with preferences, resources 
and a title to various fractions of the profits of firms; 2) a set of 
firms, each of which possesses a set of feasible activities, which 
may be expressed in terms of a production function; and 3) a 
commodity space. Innovation appears to have a natural interpreta­
tion as a production activity in such a model of an economy. If the 
output 11innovation11 is viewed as a commodity, there can be firms 
which produce innovation as a sole or joint product. A production 
process with innovation as an input will differ from a production 
process without such an input. 
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That is, following a procedure for incorporating externalities 
(Arrow, 1969) in a general equilibrium model, we can redefine the 
commodity space to include as many "innovations" as we like. Indeed, 
this is a natural procedure since when innovations are inappropriable 
their production does create externalities. An innovation is produced 
by the use of economic inputs, so that the production of innovation has 
a natural representation. Such an economy presumably underlies 
Arrow (19621, and cannot be expected to be well-behaved. 
Innovation can be regarded as an addition to a stock {of 
knowledge of feasible activities, for example) which is an input in 
production. Whether this stock is private or public must be specified 
in the model. Since knowledge is in no sense "used up" by being as 
input, the economy with innovation is essentially inter-temporal. If 
all futures markets exist, the standard reinterpretation of the commo­
dity space to index goods by time can be used. A similar construction 
can be used to incorporate uncertainty, using contingent claims 
markets. The failure of futures or conti.ngent calims markets to 
exist for innovations (or other commodities) is a potential source 
of inefficiency. 
If feasible production sets in an economy with comn:iodity 
space expanded to include innovation are characterized by inappro­
priability, indivisibility, and uncertainty, we are in a position to 
diagnose market failure and to arrive at Arrow1s (lq6z) conclusions 
about 11Welfare Economics and the Allocation of Resources to 
Invention. 11 Both process and product innovation can be included 
in this interpretation, since preferences over all conceivablE• products 
can be assumed with perfect ease. A product Lnnovation than changes 
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the feasible production set for some firm in such a way that :�n some 
dimension the set of feas
.
ible output levels goes from {o} to something 
larger. lithe product can be sold profitably, consumption in that 
dimension ·may also become non-zero. Lancaster1 s (1966) 'New Theory of 
Consumptionn may be used to extend preferences from old goods to 
new goods if the simpler assumption that preferences are defined over 
an infinite dimensional 11potential11 commodity space is unpalatable. 
This general formulation reveals certain difficulties 
Wliich lie in wait for any more approximate approach. In the general 
model a change in the allocation of resources to invention will produce 
a changed consumption allocation. This allocation produces a. welfare 
allocation, which can be compared to the initial allocation for welfare 
judgments. There is no ambiguity about the evaluation of technological 
change. It does not matter if the productivity of some factors falls 
while that of others rises;. it does not matter if some products are 
cheaper while others become more expensive. The assumption that 
each consumer has a complete.preference ordering implies th.at 
any welfare judgment which can be made about an economy with static 
technology can be made a.bout an economy with changing technology. 
But when the general equilibrium approach to the welfare economies 
19 
of invention is abandoned, all the insoluble index number and cost- benefit 
paradoxes reappear. There become as many alternative measures 
of technical progress aS there are products times factors; in general, 
as the square of the dimension of the commodity space. Even labor 
productivity is well-defined only in terms of specific outputs or indices. 
The index number problems for new products take on the character 
mentioned by Elaug (1968): because of its physical difference from 
older products, we cannot put a value on a new product. 
Samuelson1s analysis of the ''Evaluation of Real National Income11 
{ 1 9 5 0 )  is particularly relevant to the evaluation of technical change. 
If there is no '11forgetting, " a technical change is tantamount to a uniform 
outward shift in a production possibility frontier, and unambiguously 
would increase welfare if it were free. If resources must be devoted 
to an innovation, however, a choice among competing p. p. f. 1 s ffiay be 
avai�able, and no single p. p. f. may dominate. 
The m.ost n�tural approach might be to attach prices to each 
output and each factor of production, and to evaluate an innovation in 
terms of the profits (or quasi-rents) it would create. This is Arrow's 
(196Z) approach, and it is the obvious counterpart to cost-benefit 
analysis in other areas. It suffers from the same defects -- the informa­
tional requ�rements when price changes are expected to result, the welfare 
ambiguity of aggregate consumers' surplus measure, and the general 
impossibility of relating increases in the value of real national income 
to Pareto optimality. But these difficulties should not obscure two 
fundamental points; 1) that innovation, or research and development, 
or technical change, is of economic significance only because of its 
impact on social welfare through changes in the output of products 
or the demand for factors, and 2) that any evaluati.on of the process 
must be based on information as to ea'ch of the input/output ratios 
of a production activity. 
Innovation and the Theory of the Firm 
In the previous section we argued that by interpreting a 
standard general equilibrium model appropriately we can, in 
principle, make welfare statements abou� innovation. Such 
interpretation, while useful for rigorous welfare comparisons, 
is too general to provide specific theorems regarding the effect 
of exogeneous changes or policies on levels of inventive output or 
on welfare through the level of invention. Nor is there much hope 
of obtaining testable propositions from such a model, and without 
such propositions it is impossible to verify thE: underlying theory 
of innovation. For such purposes a more precise specification of 
the nature of inventive activity within the innovating firm is needed. 
The validity of any economic theory of innovation rests on its 
representation of the nature of the process of innovati.on. 
Little explicit work on the theory of the innovating firm 
has been done. In this section we will review some of the more 
interesting models which have been proposed, evaluate them 
critically, and propose some lines of future research. As an 
appendix to this report we include a paper reporting some of our 
own findings along these lines. 
One potential source of microeconomic analysis of 
innovatiori is the theoretical literature on induced innovation. The 
original di$cussion of induced bias in innovation took place in the 
context of a macroeconomic growth model. As Nordhaus (1969, 
p. 110) points out, only a few authors ever examined the microeco­
nomic foundations of their theory, and their reflections were rather 
sketchy (see Samuelson, 1965, Drandakis and Phelps, 1966, Ahmad, 
1966). Therefore it should be recognized that we are asking the 
literature to do things which its authors did not really intend, and 
that our critical remarks reflect mainly our different interest. 
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Despite this, is turns out that the constructions used in 
analyzing some macroeconomic implications of induced bias in 
innovation are also of use as _descriptions of the behavior of a 
single firm. 
Modern analysis of induced innovation appears to take -its 
start from a remark by J. R. Hicks (1932) that a fall in the price 
of labor relative to capital would induce labor-saving innovations. 
In the late fifties several authors (Salter, 1960, Fellner,1959) argued 
that "the entrepreneur is interested in reducing costs in total, not 
particular costs such as labor costs . . • . " (Salter, 1960, p.  44), 
and reached the conclusion that entrepreneurs would pursue speci­
ficallY labor-saving techniques only if 11because of some inherent 
characteristic of technology, labor-saving knowledge is easier 
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to acquire than capital-saving knowledge11 (Salter, ibid. ). Charles 
Kennedy (1964) used the assumption of a trade-off between labor- and 
capital-saving innovation to give a theoretical justification for the 
belief that a rising wage-rental ratio induces labor-saving innovation. 
He proceeded along the lines suggested by Salter, specifying a 
particular form for charac;teristics of the innovative process, which 
can be summarized as follows, 
Consider a production function Y = F(AK, BL), where A(t) and 
B(t) represent factor-augmenting technical progress. {Not all types 
of techniccil progress can be represented as factor augmenting 
{Solow, 1965),. but there are no operational procedures for telling 
which type of progress is occurring (Phelps, 1966). Then let A/A= a 
and B/B = b. Kennedy postulates a relation Y,(a, b) = 0 with the
follow.ing properties: da/dlxO and d2a/db2<0. That is, the process
of knowledge production is such that the better one becomes at 
economizing on one factor, the worse one is at economizing on the 
other. 
Kennedy1s analysis of the implications of such a trade-off 
examines the consequences of changing factor shares. His approach 
was criticized by Ahma,d (1966) who attempts to construct a niicro­
economic rationalization of the aggregate relation posited by Kennedy.
Ahmad points out that in general the relation should hav_e the f�'rm 
f(a, b, A, B) = 0, since the rate of factor-saving may depend o� h-Ow 
much of that factor is being used, as well as everything else. This 
formulation, it turns out, generalizes rather easily to a fairly 
complete theory of the innovating firm. We provide this step in 
the appendix. 
In Ahmad1s model the firm chooses which innovation 
to adopt from an exogeneously given menu. The firm cannot 
increase the rate of innovation by devoting more inputs to R&:D. 
Thus the classification of exogeneous trands in innovation plays 
an important role. 
F'or example, Ahmad concludes that 11a rise in the price 
of labor would lead to an innovation which is necessarily labor-saving, 
if the innovation possibly is technologically unbiased" (p. 349). If 
on the other hand, the historical innovation possibility is biased it 
is possible to find that after an increase (fall) i.n the price of a 
factor the use of that factor will increase (decrease). It all depends 
on what is happening exogeneousl_y, Thus we can have a case in 
which we would have used less of a factor i.f we had done without 
technical progress. 
This conclusion may appear less paradoxical when we 
realize that in Ahmad's analysis two different types of technical 
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change accompany substitution. Prices induce substitution along a 
given isoquant; they also induce the choice of an isoquant from the new 
set. It would seem reasonable to find both these effects operating in the 
same direction. But where a new isoquant will be found depends wholly 
on an exogenous change. The effects cannot be disentangled because 
there is no way to tell what would have happened if the firm did nothing 
the activity of R&D is suppressed. That is, time moves the isoquants 
in a manner entirely unaffected by the decisions of the firm. 
Nordhaus ( 197 3) dealt with one part of this problem by 
analyzing a more general case that that of Ahmad. To avoid termi­
nological confusion, Nordhaus defined 11the set of techniques attainable 
with a given cost C(as) the C-isotech. 11 He analyzes a case in which 
the location of an isotech may depend on the technique may depend on 
the technique chosen previously, on obvious generalization. In the 
same article Nordhaus also pointed out the implicit assumption in 
much of the literature that the rate of innovation is determined exo­
geneously. He argued, repeating the analysis of Nordhaus (1969) that 
unless the production of a new !PF is costly, and represented as an 
explicit production activity, 11then the theory of induced innovation 'is 
just a disguised case of growth theory with exogenous technical 
change." 
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The assumption that the rate of technical advance is predetermined 
is quite unnecessary. Nordhaus (1969} has an interesting model of 
the endogenous determination of the rate of technical change in 
which there is no choice of direction. He derives some comparative 
status results: An increase in the price of output, a fall in the rate 
of interest, or an increase in the t!life'1 of an invention will increase 
the rate of technical change. 
The inclusion of research costs explicitly in a model of 
technical change, while making for significant endogenous determination 
of rate and direction, also causes unresolved difficulties. If the rate 
of technical change cannot be controlled by the firm, then no problem 
of convexity or increasing returns can arise. U research involves 
fixed costs, then the failure of convexity is obvious. Less obvious is 
the fact that unless (a) there are very strong decreasing returns to 
conventional factors or (b) the cost of obtaining a given innovation 
rises linearly with the size of the firm, convexity will break down. 
All these points have been made by Nordhaus (1967, 1969, 1973). 
They suggest that in going to a market model we must consider 
seriously the possibility that in admitting the existence of f:echnical 
change we force ourselves to abandon competitive models. 
It is possible to conjecture what a complete model of the 
innovating firm built on these foundations would look like. In his 
original paper on induced bias Kennedy recommended the abandoning 
of the distinction between factor substitution and technical change. 
He cited the difficulty of disentangling the two effects empi:rically 
and the availability of his own idea of a trade-off between fa.ctor­
saving innovations. This argument is strengthened by the contention 
(Griliches, 1962) that no factor substitution is possible without 
technical change. Hughes (1971} argues that changes in scale also 
involve research costs and uncertainty. 
We define factor substitution as a (costless) shift from one 
known production process to another. Griliches argues that only a 
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few processes actually i.n use (defined by their activity vectors} are 
known with certainty. All others are uncertain in varying degrees, 
Therefore we do not have a single isoquant, but rather a probability 
distribution over the output achievable with certain factor combinations. 
If we add that there may be a cost to factor substitution, (a case 
analyzed by Pfouts ( 1964) in a context which did not consider technical 
change) the distinction between substitution and innovation becomes 
meaningless. A complete theory of the beh_avior of the firrrt under 
uncertainty would supplant all analysis of technical change. Note 
that even problems of indivisibility and inappropriability arise, 
because in a decision problem with uncertainty infonnation has value. 
'\iVe fear that su.ch a model, while technicaJ..ly interesting and 
capable 0£ remedying va.rious defects in current theory, would still 
fail to capture unique features of the innovative process. Its 
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achievement "°"-ould be the forcing of innovation into the mold of 
routing operation, and it would not include the real uncertainties 
and creativity associated with innovation. 
Several authors have also examined the effects of uncertainty 
on the manner in which i.nnovation proceeds. The analysis raises 
some interesting i.ssue·s, but i.t is fundamentally inconclusive as to 
policy. 
According to Arrow (1962) and others invention is 
characterized by non-insurable uncertainty. It is further asserted 
that i.n the absence of other market failure this implies that i.f 
11inventors11 are risk averse, the resulting amount of invention will 
be less than the amount needed to support a Pareto optimum. The 
theoretical justification of the conclusion about the welfare economics 
of invention is not given in detail but the conjecture is very likely. 
Let us consider the justification of the statement that risk 
aversion leads to reduction in inventive activity. The expected value 
of innovation must exceed its cost for a firm to innovate if it is risk 
averse. If there is a schedule of investment opportunities of 
decreasing yield, the risk averse firm will naturally find some 
investments unacceptable which are acceptable to the risk neutral firm. 
That is fine if all investments have the same riskiness. But 
innovation may differ in uncertainty from other investments. 
If an analysis of portfolio choice is used, the conclusion as to the 
impact of changes in risk-taking becomes ambiguous. In this 
case it is necessary to place innovation in a list of options with 
varying riskiness. 
Depending on where invention falls, a reduction in 
risk-taking could increase or reduce invention. If all other risks 
are insurable, or subject to reduction through contingent claims 
or futures markets, invention might fall at the riskier end of the 
spectrum. On the other hand, if rivalry exists, not innovating may 
be the riskier strategy. In that case a decrease in risk-taking 
might increase the amount of innovation. Thus we have no theoretical 
reason for assuming that decreasing risk aversion in general will 
increase innovation. In addition, tax policy affects innovation 
differently from other investment decisions only through its effect 
on risk-taking. Otherwise a corporate income tax will reduce the 
incentive to innovate by reducing net returns from the innovation, 
so that we could increase both innovation and investment by decreasing 
net taxes. But if it is believed that taxes are desirable despite their 
effect on invention, a much more complex argument is need•:d to 
justify reducing taxes to stimulate innovation. 
The analysis thus far should establish that the prE!ferences 
of the firm with regard to uncertain prospects, and its beliefs about 
the relative riskiness of investing in innovation, determine the amount 
of innovation the firm will pursue. Several authors in the field of 
public finance have analyzed the relation between the corporate 
income tax and the willingness of the corporation to take risks. 
We distinguish between two types of income tax: !:hose which 
do not alter the first-order conditions for present value maximization 
(neutral taxes) and those which do. Consider neutral taxes first. 
Ths most commonly discussed neutral tax is one in which 
complete loss offset is allowed, investment expenditures can be 
charged ofJ as current expenses, and refunds are paid instantly on 
negative revenue (E. C .  Brown, 1948). 
The provision of complete loss offset and the allowance 
for expensing of investment means that the level of investment 
which maximizes the present value of the firm is unchanged by 
a tax on profits (Musgrave, 1959). 
The tax laws now discriminate in this regard against 
small firms. In a large firm expensing works as a loss offs1�t since 
there are other items of net income against which the loss ca.n 
be written off. If a firm is so small (relative to the risks it incurs} 
that it has negative income in a year, additional provisions for 
refunding the (negative) tax on a loss are needed. Si.nee this does 
not exist, expensing would discourage small firms from risky 
endeavors while encouraging large firms. The tax write-off implies 
that any expenditure is reduced at the rate of taxation, while returns 
are reduced in the same proportion. The marginal investment, 
whose present value is zero, is unchanged. lnframarginal inve st­
ments will be reduced in value, but will still have positive present 
value, and will continue to be adopted. 
Musgrave ( 1959) argues that a 1 1 neutral'1 corporate income 
tax is not a usable policy instrument because it gives the government 
no revenue. He assumes constant returns and competitive conditions, 
so that every investment opportunity earns precisely the market 
rate of interest. Then by refinding X per cent of the firm1s invest­
ment and receiving X per cent of its returns the Treasury obtains no 
more money than it could obtain by selling bonds. 
Thia result is incorrect if it is ass.urned that there is a 
s chedule of investments, or decreasing returns to investment. Suppose 
the present value of an inve stment declines as more money is put 
into it. Then even with loss offset the Treasury now shares in the 
investor1s infra-marginal returns, and takes in a positive net revenue, 
since its only option is to lend at the market inte rest rate, which is 
les s than tl,le yield on all but the marginal investment. 
A s imple example will establish this point. Suppose the 
firm invests at time 0, and gets output at time I which it sells 
for p per unit. The market rate of interest is r, and the production 
function is y = f(X), where £
1
(X)) 0, f
1 1  
(X) .<. 0. The firm will 
maximize the present value of profits 
£fl.& 
!tr - w x. 
The first order condition is 
1 __£__ f (X) - w = O. !tr 
27 
Now introduce a tax t, with instant depreciation and loss of.fset. Then 
the present value is 
(1 - t)p f(X) 
!tr ( 1 -t)w x. 
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The first-order condition is unchanged by this tax - - whatever 
maximizes the present value will also maximize ( 1 -t) times the present 
value. 
Decreasing returns imply, by Eule r ' s  Theorem, that for 
l 
fixed X, f (X} X <.  f(X). At the optimum (which is independent of t),  
I 
Therefor1� £ (X) X 
and 
Therefore, · 





(X) X imply 
f(X)> J&. (!tr)  X.p 
pf(X) >  ( l+r)w X and 
tpf(X) > t (!tr) wX. 
But t( l t r )  w X  is what the government would get at  time 1 if  it invested 
the money which it refunds to the firm as a loss offset because of 
instant depreciation, and tpf(X) is what i.t actually gets at titne l 
in tax revenue. There is a net reve nue to the Treasury in this 
case, which increases with diminishing returns. 
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Musgrave ( 19 5 9 )  and Domar and Musgrave { 1 9 44) argue that with 
complete loss offset and adequate deprec iation on increase i n  the tax 
rate reduces both expected lo s s e s  and gains in the same proportion, 
and that the expected value of earnings is reduced in the same percentage 
for all a s s e t s .  Risk and income are reduced proportionately. They 
a s s ume decreasing -marginal utility of income and increasing marginal 
utility of risk (and separability). With these a s s umptions and full 
los s  offset the investor will increase the risk he bears i n  order to 
increase his income when the tax rate increases. A s  we argued 
before, this may or may not increase innovation, depending on how 
relatively risky innovation is s e e n  to be. 
In the case of the non-neutral tax, w e  have both on income 
and a s ubs titution effect in regard to risk. The r e s ult is that a n  
increase in a tax without loss offset may increase risk-taking or 
may; decrease risk-taking (Musgrave, 320). If the marginal utility 
of income of the investor i.s constant - - a case which we might 
expect to be true of a corporation with perfect access to funds 
increasing a non- neutral tax reduces risk-taking. Under the 
same conditions a neutral tax affe cts risk-taking not at all. It 
does appear that under any conditions , making a tax closer to 
neutrality .w i.11 not decrease risk-taking, and may increase it. 
The neutral tax may affect innovation through another 
route. Musgrave shows that although the decision to invest does 
not affect the amount of inve s tment if the firm i s  risk neutral, i t  
does reduce the s i z e  of . e ntrepreneurial returns. If innovation is 
an entrepreneurial function, increasing even a perfect tax wo.uld 
reduce innovation. 
Although the se examples suggest that there may be a 
relation between corporate income taxes and innovation, its direction 
can only be determined by empirical research. How risky innovation 
is, and how the decision to i nnovate is affected by reduction in 
entrepreneur ial returns must be known. Every effect on innovation 
is a c companied by another of apposite sign. But we do dnovv that 
if the firm does not face capital constraints, and if there is no 
entrepreneurial function, changes in income tax will have no special 
effect on innovation. 
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Thus we find t.hat the theory of the relation between tax 
policy and investment suggests that any change i n  tax policy can 
either increase or decrease i.nnovation. Quantitative e s timates of 
the size of effects are needed to a s s e s s  the overall impact. 
Moreover, the sens itivity of r e s ults to the nature of the 
firm1s prefe rences, a,nd the difficulty of determining the se p:refe rences 
for a joint stock corporation (Smith, 1974),  suggests that we are 
unlikely to be able to predict the effects of tax policy for sorr:te time. 
We are i n  no better state with respect to other mechanisms for 
risk spreading. 
Conclusions 
This survey has highlighted four major areas which should 
have high priority i.n funding of theoretical research. We realize 
that the R&D A s s e s sment Program has a s s igned a relatively low 
priority to theoretical work in general, but we argue that this policy 
is very mistaken. The gaps in our ability to construct sensible 
theory applicable to the innovative process are so large that 
economists have little to offer the policy making proce s s  beyond 
some limited empirical observations. This limitation will not be 
removed until the theoretical foundations are repaired. 
The four areas to which we a s s ign high priority are 1 )  the 
development of adequate welfare criteria for judging the social 
and economic desirability of policies affecting R&D; 2)  the investi­
gation of the effe ct of uncertainty o n  decision-making in R&:D, 
and in particular the specification of risk- spreading institutions, 
appropriate to the innovative proce s s ,  which rninimize adverse 
incentive effe cts; 3) the exploration of the implications for appro­
p riability of inventions of the hypothes i s  that technical knowledge 
is embodied in individuals or research teams, and 4) the construction 
of detailed models ,  inco rporating unce rtainty in a fundamental way, 
of how the nature and direction of innovative activity responds to 
market foi- c e s .  I n  this context, research i s  needed tu explore the 
policy relevance of Hi.rs chle i.fe r 1 s  view of the market structure for 
information as a commodity. 
3 1  
These four areas have been defined i n  the body o f  o u r  report, 
where we have surveyed the present state of unde r s tanding o f  these 
problems and indicated in more detail how future research might proceed, 
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l .  Thits paper is concerned with a classic question in the theory 
of innovations, namely, the question 1 1 does an increase in the wage rate 
lead .towards an increase in the production and use of labor-augmenting 
innovations'/' 11 Section 2 of this paper contains a brief survey of the 
literature dealing with this question. Most of the existing literature takes 
a macroeconomic approach to the problem of factor augmenta�tion bias 
and in addition directs its attention only at the u s e  of innovations, with 
the menu of innovations available to the society being taken a:; given 
exogenously. Our approach in this paper is microeconomic, in order 
to deal explicitly with the issue of allocation of resources to the production 
of innovations and with the re sponsiveness 9f that production to the price 
signals provided by the factor markets. Because of aggr egation problems 
the conclusions derived in this paper do not necess arily carry over in a 
direct fashiQn to macro models of the economy, but at least c1:!rtain 
issues are raised by those conclusions that are relevant to the study of 
innovation in a macro context. 
Briefly, the model that we employ is that of a profit -maximizing 
firm that produces a final output and also engages in '1in house" R & D 
activities that result in the pr oduction of labor- and capital-augmenting 
innovations specialized to the final product production proces s .  The 
firm is assumed to be a rr1onopolist in the market for its final product.[!)
2 
We assume that the firm1s production activities can be summarized in 
terms of well-behaved neoclassical production functions. The notion 
of an 11innovations possibilities setn is introduced at the level of the 
firm, and we show that the set is convex, with strict convexity occurring 
?nly if there is decreasing returns to scale in the production of innovations. 
These results are the microcounterparts of the Kennedy postulate of 
convexity of the aggregate innovations possibilities set. 
The profit-maximizing choices of the firm are derived from a 
control-theory formulation of the firm's activities. The wage-rental 
ratio is assumed to be fixed over time, and we attempt to analyze the 
consequences for labor- and capitalmaugmenting innovations of a shift in 
that wage-rental ratio.[
2 J
. By considering a relatively extensive model of the innovating firm, 
we can examine several complicating features of irinovation. The first is 
the ?-ependence of current innovation possibilities on past innovative activity. 
The second is the influence of changes in factor prices on the choice of
innovative inputs ,  since the same factors as are augmented may themselves 
be used to pr_oduce innovations. Each of these considerations can produce 
paradoxical results as to the influence of prices on· the direction of technical 
change. We establish first those few properties of technical change which 
do not depend on specific assumptions on the form of the dependence of 
current innovations possibilities on past innovative activity. Then by 
ex2.mining simple cases we show how the complications described make 
it impossible to state in general how changing factor prices will affect 
innovation. 
Specific results are obtained for two special cases: first, the 
case in which the percentage rate of increase in augmentation is independent 
of the levels of such augmentation; and second, the case where the output 
of factor-augmenting innovations is independent of the levels of augmentation. 
These two cases exhibit quite different 11cornparative dynamic11 properties, 
arid illustrate the dependence of the conclusions reached concerning the 
responsiveness of outputs of innovations, on the a6Sumptions made 
concerning the characteristics of the production processes employed 
by th.e firm. 
3 
2. At least since J. R. Hicks1 conjecture in the Theory of Wages 
that increases in the wage rate call forth labor-saving innovations ,  
it has been recognized that changing factor prices may affect innovation. 
The conjecture is ,  as we shall show, not obviously true. Nor has it 
been unchallenged. Fellner ( 1962) and Salter (1960) have argued precisely 
the c:ipposite, that although an anticipated change in prices might bias 
inventive activity, there is no reason to expect a difference in innovation 
under conditions of continuing high wages than under continuing high profits . 
The arguments by both authors are based on the idea that the firm does 
not care what kind of costs are reduced; it simply wants to reduce total 
costs as quickly as possible. 
Two separate points appear at issue. One relates to exogenous 
trends in. innovation or innovation possibilities, and disag:reements arise 
from differin� priors on the direction of exogenous lrends.[3 J The other
point, which we address in this paper, is whether and how, in a world 
with � exogenous trend, innovations will respond to prices. 
Despite the in'lportant role which technical progress has played 
in �odel1s of economic growth, tb.e problem of determining how the bias 
in technical change will respond to changes in factor prices has never been 
the subject of a complete formal analysis. Analysis of induced technical 
change has concentiated mainly on finding conditions under which the 
economy will have a long-run balanced growth path consistent with 
a limited set of 11stylized facts. 11 In the major recent treatments of induced 
innovation [Samuelson ( 1965), Conlisk (1969) , Nordhaus ( 1 969 ) ,  Drandakis 
and Phelps ( 1966)), it is assumed that the quantity of labor to be employed 
is detern1ined exogenously, and the quantity of capital is determined by 
4 
s aving and investment, Equilibrium and optimal growth paths are found 
by appropriate optimizations using labor and capital supplies to define 
constraints. This approach is fundamentally macroeconomic. 
Although these models focus on the question of how to choose 
from among an exogenously given set of innovation possibilities,  they 
arrive at results which are special cases of the model in which innovations 
are literally produced. A brief survey of these results will set the stage 
for the mcidels of this paper. 
Samuelson ( 1965) examines a formal model of innovation using 
Kennedy's ( 1 964) idea of an innovation poss ibility frontier [IPFJ. We revise 
his notation to be consistent with ours. Assume a production function 
F (- , : )  which is homogeneous of degree one. If technical progress is 
factor augmenting we can define the variables of the production function 
to be A (t)K, B(t)L, so that Y = F(A(t)K, B(t)L). The various derivatives 
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Since F is homogeneous of degree one we can define 
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f'(v) = F I  
f - vf'(v) = F 2.  
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We can call v the 1 1augmented capital-labor ratio. n 
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The share of capital in output, QIK'  can be defin·ed in terms of 
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Following Sainuelson we define a cOst function 
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subject to 
Samuelson exploits certain 1 1duality11 relations between C and F. 
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Finally, Samuelson assumes an exogenous innovation poss ibility frontier, 
written 
b f(a) 
where f1(a) < 0 ,  f"(a) < O. 
Samuelson assumes that firms act to minimize the instantaneous 
rate of reduction in unit cost. The rate is obtained by evaluating �C /Co t  
ac _ 2- (-
r ) c 2-(_:!!___) at - cl dt Alt)  + z dt B(t) 
[ ;. :B J  � - c{-z + czw-2 + S A  A B 
w + c2 B 
- [a c r � +  
or A 
ac BJ ac .- w - + - r aw B Or 
ac . + - w aw 
= r: .  A wL A + F · B l K · L ·- + -r + - w.B _ F F 
c 
c 
rK wL r K . L . l 
CF 
a + CF b
 - LcF r + CF w _ 
[
Kr + Lw l a-Ka + a- Lb - CF ...J 
The firm chooses a and b to maximize this express ion subject to 
b = f(a). Substituting and differentiating we have 
d 
da [<>Ka + " Lf(a))





Under the assumed conditions f!(a) < 0 ,  fl!(a) < 0 we can solve 
for the inverse function 
a " 
g(":) = f'r- 1 1 (,: )  • 
where g'  £11 < O. By successive eliminations we can obtain an 
expression 
-a = h(£1�) .
By using the first order conditions we obtain Q'K and a- L in terms of
AK and BL; further substitution enables us to express AK and BL in 
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(f - vf1 ) (vfn + f') - vf'(f' - vf" - fl) 
(I - vf1 ) 2 
Since 
_ Vff" + f 1 (f  - Vf1)-
2 (f - vf') 
Ct 
flvff" + f' (f - vf') 
f'(f - vf')2 (f - vf')2 · 
IT 
f!(f - vf') 
vff'l 
d(JS) 
°'L £1 f' 
a(!�) 
= 
- + ----(]" f - v(' 
£.....=...!£. 
-tr(f - vf')




Since f' > 0 and f - vf' > 0 by assumption, 
a("K) "L. > 
a(!�) < 
0 � er  2:. 1 .
< 
> > Therefore h' < 0 � o- < l .
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Drandakis and Phelps ( 1966) assume that the firm maximizes 
the instantaneous proportionate rate of g rowth in output with fixed inputs .  




F '  
which is to be maximized. Bias they define as 
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a2F 
8K8t MK - ML . 
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A s suming factor augmentation, they obtain an expression 
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which is the same maximand as Samuelson's. 
In an Appendix, Drandakis and Phelps derive the following 
exp:i;-e s s ion for bias 
1 - IT D = --(b - a).
IT 
Thus whether o r  not an in.crease in the augmentation coefficient for a 
9 
factor results in a reduction in the use of that factor (in natural units) 
depends on the elasticity of substitution. For er < 1 the expected results 
hold. 
3. We next examine the properties of a model of in house R & D 
conducted by a firm that produces a final product that incorporates the 
innovations produced by the R & D labs. We are particularly interested 
in the way in which profit-maximizing behavior leads to an allocation of 
resources between the production of capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting 
innovations in response to the market wage-rental situation. 
1 0  
The model is a s  simple as  possible. The firm is  assumed to 
be a mOnopolist in the market for its final output Y, produced using 
labor L1 and capital K 1 hired in .
competitive factor markets. Labor
and capital used in the production of the final product are augmented by 
innovations produced in the R & D operations of the firm. Thus AK 1 
and BL1 represent the effective amounts of capital and labor employed 
in producing the final output. 
R & D activities are summarized in two production activities, 
one producing capital-augmenting innovations , A, with the other pro­
ducing labor -augmenting innovations, B. Innovations are assumed to be 
specialized to labor and capital employed in producing the firm1 s final 
output, s o  that the labor and capital used in the R & D departments are 
not augmented by the innovations produced. L2 and K2 represent labor 
and capitil employed to produce A while L3 and K3 denote labor and
capital used in the production of B. 
Before turning to the conditions characterizing a profit-maximizing 
time path for the firm, we first explore the properties of the "innovations 
possibilities set11 for the firm. The "in-house11 innovations poss ibilities 
set is defined as those combinations of A and :B that can be obtained 
for a given cost in terms of capital and labor, assuming that A and B 
are fixed, 
To obtain the outer boundary of this set, we s olve the foliowing 
problem. 
Max A = ¢ (K 2, L2, A , B) 
subject to ( 1 )  B = C 
(wher e  B = 'l'(K3, L3 , A, B)) ;
(2) w(L2 + L3 ) + r(K2 + K3 ) = M
r/J and 'Y are assumed to be homogeneous of some positive degrees 
leas than or equal to 1, and ¢ and 'f are quasi- concave. 
Let H = ¢ + ;\ 1 ('l' - G) + \ 2(
M - w(L2 + L3) - r(K2 + K3)).
A t  a constrained maximum we have 
(i) ¢K - r\2 = 0 
(ii) ¢ L - w\2 = 0 
(iii) \ l 'l'K - r\2 = 0 








(v) 'l' - C = 0 
(vi) M - w(L2 + L3) - r(K2 + K3) 
¢KL 0 0 0 - r  
¢LL 0 0 0 -w 
0 'l'KK 'l'K L  'f �r -r 
0 'l'LK 'l'LL 'l' L -w 
0 'l'K 'l'L 0 0 
-w -r -w 0 0 
1 1  
0 
then at a regular constrained maximum, A*' has the property that ] A * I > O .




¢KdK2 + ¢ L dL2 
'l'KdK3 + 'l' L dL3 
From (2) ,  wdL2 + rdK2 -(wdL3 + rdK3) 
while from (i) - (iv), 
dA _ 
<18 -
rA 2aK2 + wA 2aL2 
r(�:)dK3 + w(��)dL3 
-\ I 
1 2  
if 




Differentiating the first order conditions with respect to B 
we obtain the system 
qlKK ¢KL 0 0 0 
qlLK ¢LL 0 0 0 
0 0 VKK VKL VK 
0 0 'l'LK 'l'LL 
·l'L 
0 0 VK 'l'L 0 





where A;5 dB = I A* I  
the fifth row and column from A *. 











- r  dK
2 I I 0 
-w dL
2 I I 0 
- r  dK3 I 0 
= 
-w dL3 I 0 0 d" ' dB 
0 d"2 I I 0 
is the cofactor formed by deleting 
'l'KK 
'l'LK 
- r  
¢KK 
¢ LK 
- r  
'¥KL - r  
'¥LL -w 
-w 0 
¢KL - r  
¢LL -w 
- w  0 
d" 1 
dB = 
If ¢ and '¥ are homogeneous of degree one, then A;S = 0 and 
0. If ¢ and 'f are homogeneous of pos itive degree less than one, 
;. 
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note that I 'l'KK '!'KL - r 
VLK '!'LL -w 
'!'KK '!'KL 'l'K 
'!'LK '!'LL '!'L 
(�) 2 
" 2 
- r  -w 0 
I '!'K 'l'L 0 
while I ¢ KK ¢KL - r  
¢ LK ¢LL -w 
¢KK ¢KL ¢K 
¢LK ¢ LL ¢ L  
I 2 Ci.) 
- r  -w 0 ¢ K ¢ L  0 
Under quai;i- concavity and positive homogeneity of degree less than one, 
both of .thes e  express ions are positive. 
Hence we conclude that when ¢ and '±' exhibit constant returns , 
the IP set  is convex with a straight line outer boundary. Under decreasing 
returns to scale, homogeneity and quasi- concavity, the IP �1et is convex 
with the outer boundary a strictly concave function. The cases are shown below, 
L / / ./ / / A. B 
Constant returns to r/J and 'f 
A 
[ ./ ,/ / / /' :B 
Decreasing returns to ¢ and 'f 
The In- House I. P. Set 
(Note that because A and B are assumed fixed, precisely the same diagrani.s 
appear if we replace A by A/A and B by B/B). 
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4. Turning to the implications of profit maximization for the allocation 










;. ¢(A, B ,  K2L2) 
B = '!'(A, B, K3L3) 
A(O) = AO B(O) BO 
L I + L2 
+ L3 
Kl + Kz + K3 , Y = F(AK1 , BL1 ) 
Let H -6t (pF - wL - rK]e + ). 1¢ + ). 2'1' 
First order conditions are given by�4J
[ 
- ot (I )  (MR)F 1A - r]e = 0 
-Ot (7) X1 = -(MR)F 1 K1 e · \¢A - ). Z'l'A . -6' (2) [(MR)F 
2B -
w]e = 0 
- Ot (3) -re + ). l¢ K = 
0 








-Ot (6) .-we + ).2yL = 0 
-St  (8)  x2 = 
-(MRJF2
L1 e - ).1¢ B - ).2'l
'
B 
(9l . A. = ¢ 
( ! OJ P. - 'I' 
with transversality conditions lim >..1 = O, lim ). Z = O; 
where 
t- t-+i:n 
- £!?. - _E_ MR - p + dY' F 1 - a(AK ) ' 1 
8F [5] F 2 = a(BL ) . I 
1 5  
We will work with the special case i n  which p(Y) i s  assumed to 
s atisfy lim p(Y) = + c�, 
Y-+O 
lim p(Y) = 0, p(Y) � 0 for all Y: � 0 with � < 0 
Y-= 
for all Y :::::, O. Further, F, ¢, and '¥ are assumed to be "well behaved" 
neoclassical production functions. In particular F is homogeneous of 




, and K3, L3 respectively. 
Thus F(AK
1 , BL1 ) 
= BL1F ( v1 , l ) : BL1f(v1 ) wh.,re v1 
Further, lim f(v1 ) = + cc, lim f( v1 ) = 0, f(v1 ) > 0 for v1 > 0 and V1..;>0 Vi-+1-"" · - -
£1{v1 ) >· 0, f11(v1 ) < 0 for 
v
1 2:: O. 
AK1 
BL • I 














vz = L ·  v3 = L ·  g and h are assumed to obey the sa1ne neoclassical
2 3 
properties as 1.£6 J 
Finally, let µ1 = · A 1
e6't, µ2 
= A 2
e6,t. Thus the first order 
conditions may be rew:ritten as follows. 
( I ' )  [(MR)Af' - r]e·ot = 0 (6')  - w + µ2(h - v3h')y = 0
( 2 ' )  [(MR )B(f - v
1f') 
- w]e -Ot = O (7' )  µ 1 = �µ! - (MR)f'Kl - µ 1a • L2g 
(3 ' )  - 1'  + µ
1 g 'O' = 0 ( 8 ' )  ii2 = 0µ2 - (MR)(f - v/')Ll 
(4') - w  + µ 1 ( g  - v·2g 1 )0- = o - µzy ' I. .. 3h 
(5 ' )  - x + µ
2
h1y = o (9 ' )  A = c> (A)L2g(v2) 





Then ( I ' ) - ( 6 ' )  can be used to establish that 
!'_ __ ! _ _  2 _ 3 
[f - v f'] g - v g' h - v h'
A f' - g' - h1 
1 6  
We are particularly concerned with the case where w is constant 
over time. For that case we have 






Under the neoclassical conditions , v2 and v3 are uniq.uely determined
by w, and are constant over time when w is constant.
w = 
Further, given w, A. and B, v1 is uniquely determined, while




�f (� - �) 
where er 
f 
is the elastic.ity of substitution between augmented capital and 
augmented labor in the production of the firm's £.i.nal product. 
Kl A 




c�r - 1 i (� - �)-
This result corresponds to that obtained. by Samuelson ( 1965),
It asserts the following. 
(i) If tr 
f = l so that F is Cobb-Douglas, the capital .. labor ratio in
producing the firm's final product is independent "Of the relative rates of 
innovation so far as capital and labor augmentation is concerned;
17 
{ii} If er f > 1 ,, then the capital-labor ratio in producing the final 
product increases if the rate of increase in capital-augmenting innovations 
exceeds the rate of increase in labor-augmenting innovations, and conversely; 
(iii) If er! < 1 ,  the capital-labor ratio in producing the final product 
falls if the rate of i:icrease in capital-augmenting innovations exceeds the 
ratio of increase in labor-augmenting innovations, and conversely. 
'J�hus far we ha.ve only exploited the cost-minimizing properties 
of the model. The properties that follow from profit maxi1nization can be 
derived as follows .
Note that conditions ( 1 1 ) .:. ( 1 0 ' )  are all identities in t. Differentiating 
(3 ') with respect to t gives 
- r + µ g 'a 1A + µ. ag11V + ag 1µ = o I I Z I 
For W 0, v2 o and µ 1 
r cx 1A ;;gt - µ i --;-·
From (7')�  µ1 6µ 1 - (MR)f'KI - µ1<> ' L2g .






Or + r 
<> g' 
Simila:rly, using (5 1 )  and (8 1 )  we have 
(MR)(f - v1
f')L1
Eir + r 
Yh' 
It follows that 
( f' ) - Y.!!' ;f � v1f1 ql - ag •  ' 
which implies q1 !,_ (� \ in turn leading toB w r:i g ' / '  
(**) �l 










(� - I ) (!,_ - !,_)f A B 
Both (*) and (':<*) must hold s imultaneously along a profit-maximizing 
time path. There are of course a multitude of cases that might be of interest 
in the study of factor bias and innovation. Here we look only at those cases 
in which a 1 1quasi-steady state11 is achieved in the sense that the capital-labor 
ratios in all three activities (F, ¢ , 'fl are constant over time, i. e. , cases in 
which q1 = 0 is an identity in t.[?
]
For such cases ,  the analysis of 11comparative dynamics ' ' is 
particularly simple, especially in attempting to determine the impact on 
the system of a change in the wage-rental ratio w. 
Case 1 .  A /  A and B; B independent of A and B. 
Recently, Ahmad (1 966) and Nordhaus (1973 ) have emphasized the 
critical importance of the level of technological progress on the rate of 
advance of such progress JS] Their comments are best understood by
considering the case in which the rate of progress is independent of the 
level already achieved. In terms of the model developed here, this is the 
case where a (A) = C1A,  
be unity. From (**) G.1 = 
y(B) = C B for some constants c1, c2• We take c1, C to2 
h' 
2 
0 for all t with q1 = w (g.) · If crf # 1 ,  then
A B • 
A - B = 0 from ( .... ) and hence v1 = 
A 
Bq1 is also constant over time at
the level v = !!. _,., (!!.'..) 1 B " ,g' . 
L2g(v2) = L3h(v3) .
. A B Since A = L2g(v2) ,  B = L3h(v3) ,  we have
Consider a change in w and its effects on the system. 
h' F'rom q
1 
= wgr , we have
dql
dw 





dv3 -(h' ) z
aw = hh"-
(dql = w- (h ' l zdw g'h 
dv2
> O, dw 
h' ) h' + - + ­g g' 
h' ' -h1 P" 1  l \  w - 1 + �  + - 1  g1 \ h g w J 







1- + l] > o. lw + v3 w + v2 w 
19 
Thus, when AJA and BIB are independent of A and B ,  an increase 
in the wage-rental ratio increases the capital-labor ratios in both final 
goods production and in the R & D operations of the firm. (f - v f')




c - Vlf) (;ff"� 
dw = --f,-- d(B/A) - BIA (f') z 
dv1
dw A 1 dvl- = -d(B/A) + - -w B crf v1 
A dv1 = B dq1 + q1d(A/B)
dvl dql B - = - + - d(A/ B) v
l ql A 
dq 
-1 - !!_ d(B/ A). q i B 
<T - 1 dq dw = !,_ d(B/A) [ -f--J + _!__ ! , w B crf er q f I 








{ I  I dq I} 7i ; - l.Tfql a;-
[ "£ l { I I ( I 
{j f 
- l_ ; - l.T f ; 
.,. 
I + --­w + v2 - w :  v)} 
r_f ] {1 _ J_ ( I La-f - 1 "f 
+ -w- _w_'} w + v2 - w + v3) 
I w(v 3 - v 2) } 
= cr
f -
1 {(a-f - i) + (w + v2)(w + v3) 
w(v3 - v2) I I + (o-[ I ) (w + vz)(w + v3)
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Thus the sign of d<:!A )  depends o n  the elasticity of substitution
of augmented capital and labor in producing the final output, together wi_th 
the relative capital intensities of labor and capital-augmenting innovations . 
In general we have 
I d(B / A )  
;:: O <O > ;--:_ l dw f 
w(v3 - vz) > 
(w + vz){w + v3 ) < - I 
Still, it is worthwhile identifying expli citly certain cases in which 
the 11expected" result occurs in that an increase in the wage- rental 2"atio 
increases the output of labor-augmenting innovations relative to capital­
augmenting innovation s .  
First, i f  both innovative activities have the same capital intensities,  
then B /A increases with increases in w .
Second, rrf > 1 and v3 > v2 ; that i s ,  if labor and capital are good
eubstitutes for one another so far as the final good is concerned, and labor ­
augmenting innovations are relatively more capital intensive than capital-
augmenting innovations, B/A increases \vith w. 
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Third, <Tf�l and Vz..2_v3 ,  the case in which there is poor substitut ­
ability in producing the final good and capital-augmenting innovations are 
more capital intensive than labor-augmenting innovations ,  B /A again 
increases with w. 
Thus even in the special case where rates of change of innovative 
activity are independent of the levels achieved, the question as to whether 
an increase in the 'wage-rental ratio leads to concentration on labor­
augmenting innovations rests on the empirical properties of the production 
r elations within the firm. 
Case 2. A and B independent of A and B. 
A s econd case in which q
uas i - s teady states occur is that in which 
the outputs of the innovative activities (and not s imply the percentage rates
of change of such outputs ) are independent of the levels achieved. In terms
of our model, this is l:he case where O'(A) = C1 , y(B)  = c 2 for some fixed 
constants C1 and c2• To s implify things, we take these constants both 
to be unity. By (**) v•1e have 
q 1 = A _ ! + cl _  o- 1A 
q 1 A B y et 
A ii 
p;- - "B · 
on the other hand, by (�') 
q l  
q l  
(c - n rA _ !'!) f \ A  B 
Hence if rrf f-
2, A / B is constant over time, with 
A (h') 
q1 







= - - 1dw + -·wd(A / B) 
B gi / g i 
!__ dq I 
q 1 dw 
I 
- + B /A 
d(A/B) 
w dw + 
B f - vlf1 w = :A (-£-, -) 
(g r h11dv A 3 h'gr 'dv2) + -� 




w t  v3 + w + v2 
l - .,. ( __ {'\ �  d(B/A) 





Substituting for I 
dql 
ql cl;; ' 
we obtain




{� (i - }) - �£ C: v2 - w : v)} 
{( I - rr )  + (-w- _ _ w _ \} 
"t f w + v2 w + v3J 
w(v
3 
- v2) " 
(w + vz){w + v3
)J= l.. { 1rr f 
-
er f + 
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Thus for O" f < l and v3 � v2, an increase in the wage- rental
ratio leads to an expansion of output of labor-augmenting innov�tions relative 
to capital-augmenting innovations, . while if lT f > 1 and v 2 2: v 3 the opposite
result obtains . Note that these are quite different cases than those identified 
in Case l above. 
Finally, consider the case where o- (A)  
q i  By (**).  
qi
( I  - m) [� - �J . 
q 
Am, y (B) Bm•
For O" f -/: 
2 - m, (�') implies __!q
i 
0 with A/B constant over time, 
h1 B m- 1and with q1 = w (gi) (A) 
B m- l h1 h1 B 2 Thus dq = (-) (rlaw + -w(m - l )f�) m- d(B/A)
1 A g J g' \A 
m- 1 [g'h"dv - h' g"dv ] (B) 3 2 + - w A (g ' ) 2 
I dql so that - -­
q1 dw
I A - + (m - 1 )­w B 
d(B/A) + (---1 _ + --!-) · 
dw w + v3 w + v2 
From 
f - v £1 
� (--f-' -1-) and with o-£ j: 1 we have w 
A d(B/A ) = � {l _ _ I_ 
d
q l} B dw 1 - a-f w rr fql dw 
l dql Substituting for - d ;  we obtain qi w 
A d(B/A)w- ·---
B dw 
= -1 - {11 
o-f - m 
tlJ{v3 
- v2) 
- rr ) +  1 f (w + v2)(w + v3)J · 
Clearly the cases m = 1 (O' (A) = c 1
A ,  y(B) = C2B) and 
m = 0 (ct (A) = c 1 , y ( B) "' c2) are covered by the above formula, 
The Sign of d(B/ A) clearly depends crucially on m.' dw 





dw I + 
l!!!_:_U 
"r
- ro ( l
w(v 3 - v 2) [� f - I ]- <Tf) + (w + v3 )(w + v2) ;rf - m
For m =  0, 
..!!!_ dq 1 
ql 
dij) =
� - 1  
l + -f- [1 
rrf
w(v
3 - v2) J+ (w + v3)(w + v2) 
Thus for that special case at least, the response of the capital­
labor ratio in producing the final product to changes in w depends on the 
elas ticity of substitution and on the relative capital intensities in the 
innovating sector, 
23
There are no doubt other "quasi- steady state" situations where 
comparative . dynamic. results could be obtained. For example , in the 
Cobb-Douglas cas e ,  q 1  is determined by w and is cons tant over time, but 
Z4 
A/B' generally is time dependent in that case. What we have tried to do
is to indicate the fact that in the context of. a profit-maximizing model, the 
links between the wage-rental ratio and the direction of innovative activity 
are 'generally quite complex and that there are no obvious s imple generalizations 
even under ''quasi-steady state11 conditions, 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  Nordhaus ( 1969) has argued convincingly that under the assumptions 
we make about the manner in which innovations are produced and 
us��a. the production of innovations is only consistent with a compe­
titive market structure under unrealistic conditions which also 
complicate the analysis to an unmanageable degree, On the other 
hand, the model we employ can be viewed as one in which an in de -
pendent producer. of innovations sells his innovations to a competi­
tive industry, capturing the monopoly profits from the production 
of innovations . Excluding the case of 11big11 innovations (see Arrow 
(1962.)), the analysis is identical in either formulation of the model. 
2. Note that in this model the firm is certain about a11 present and 
future prices, and about the nature of the innovation �hich will 
renult from the use of specific quantities of inputs to innovative 
activity. 
3. Two important contributions to the theory of induced innovation
by A hmad ( 1 9 6 6 )  and Nordhaus ( 1 9 7 3 )  are left out of this survey
because they concentrate on the classification of bias in exogenous
trends.
4. We have ignored non-negativity constraints on the control and 
state variables because of the special assumptions to be imposed 
on P, F, ¢ •. and 1¥ as noted below. 
5. The first order conditions as stated differ in two crucial respects
from those obtained by maximizing the ins-tantaneous rate of cost
reduction. First, the explicit consideration of the factor inputs
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to innovation implies that s imply considering what happens to the
price of a factor used in final goods production does not provide
sufficient information to allow conclusions about bias in technical
progress. If that factor is also used in innovation, then additional
conditions are needed. Second, the conditions for profit maximi­
zation over time depend on more than relative shares.
6. We have assumed a kind of 1 1strong independence" wit:h respect to 
the production of innovations in that ¢ is independent of B, and 1¥ 
is independent of A .  This amounts to assuming the lack of inter­
dependence in research activities with respect to capital- and labor-
8.ugmenting innovations, and is at best a s impliflication that is hard
to justify except in terms of the ease of manipulation of the model. 
The same is true of the separability assumptions relating to Q' and y .
7. When prices are constant over time and q1 = 0, both factors are
always augmented at the same proportional rate, independently of 
the s ize of UJ. When UJ is different between time paths, only the
relative levels of augmentation, not the rates, are changed. This
would appear to _support and clarify Fellner 1s  argumCnt.
8. Ahmad ( 1 966) has pointed out the contrast between the results
obtained when the IPF relates A. IA-to B I B  and the results when it
relates A to :B, and the importance of specifying how the current
innovation possibilities depend on past choices (which imply current
levels of A and B). Nordhaus ( 1 973) disposes of the relevance of Ahmad's
conclusions to growth theory by s_howing that a necessary condition
for balanced growth equilibrium is that the !PF a = h(b, A, B) be
independent of B in the sense 8hl8B = O. There is at least a
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surface similarity between the Nordhaus condition and t.he cases 
to be examined here. However,  it should be emphasized that our 
model is explicitly concerned with the endogenous production of 
innovations, while the Ahmad approach is one in which movements of 
the IPF are determined exogenously, subject only to their dependence 
on the levels of A and B already achieved. It might be that there is 
some closer connection between Nordhaus 's  notion of independence 
and that employed here, but it has not been possible as yet to 
discover such a connection. 
ZB 
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